peace of the Treaty of Versailles as a mockery of the principles of collective security and self-determination, the two key principles supposedly animating the entirety of the Paris Peace Conference. The moribund League of Nations, the creation of which was the biggest achievement of the Peace Conference, was dogged from the outset by its failure to include Russia and Germany. It had become the supreme embodiment of the huge chasm between warm American idealism and cold European reality.
Instead of being, in Wilson's words, a "definite guarantee of peace,"2 the League of Nations became a wellspring of resentment that would fuel the horrors of the Second World War. Within ten years from the signing of the Treaty, the apparatus of collective security instituted by the League fell apart. Japan, one of the founding members, withdrew from the League after its occupation of the Chinese territory of Manchuria in 1931. This would be followed by the withdrawal of Germany, and the Italian invasion of modern-day Ethiopia. In addition, the various peoples in the new nations created in the wake of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had various reasons to dislike, if not, outright reject the Versailles settlement. Ethnic Germans in Poland and Czechoslovakia felt betrayed by what appeared to be a denial of their right to national self-determination. Polish leaders resented several terms of the Polish Treaty which recognized Poland as an independent state, particularly those concerning minority rights, as unwarranted interference with their national sovereignty. And Eastern European Jews felt that the League did not go far enough in protecting their group and individual rights.
This account of the Versailles tragedy, and in particular, the focus on the failure of Wilson's idealism to grasp and to take into account the sordid reality of the European situation, has now become a tired truism. As the story goes, with his obstinate zeal and signature high-minded rhetoric -at one point, the French minister of war Georges Clemenceau exclaimed that talking to Wilson felt as if he was talking to Jesus Christ3 -Wilson's seemingly unrealistic attempt to remodel the entire structure of international affairs after the war resulted in a League of Nations which was a mere shadow of what it was originally envisioned to be. The Treaty's rejection by the U.S. Senate, and consequently, the exclusion of the United States as a founding member, notwithstanding a courageous and physically taxing
